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Introduction
The category of nature within Arendt’s thought, as Maurizio Passerin d’Entrèves has 
commented, is granted an ambiguous status (D’Entrèves 1994: 6-7). Whilst on the one 
hand The Human Condition narrates the victory of the animal laborans which elevates 
labor to the highest end of humanity, it also explains how the developments of this same 
period are embodied by their increasing artificiality, characterised by the radical embrace 
of technology, expansionist capitalist economics and the abstract tendency towards the 
over-rationalisation of modern science. This seems to stretch Arendt’s critique of 
modernity in two contrary directions where in the first instance human activity is reduced
to nature, to cycles of production and consumption; whilst in the second, the same period 
also promises the technological liberation from such natural limitations. Though the role 
of ‘Nature’ might be enthused with ambiguity, it is important to note that Arendt’s work 
operates within a complex picture which perhaps suggests that it should not be 
approached from the perspective of a hard dichotomy between the natural and the 
artificial. As she points out, the ‘human condition’ refers to a composition of forms of 
activity that both link humanity to the biological and ecological processes that condition 
our existence, and which also includes the more productive and creative aspects of life 
that allow us to positively relate to the givenness, facticity and thrownness of our 
existence (Loidolt 2018: 44) that such a rigid account of ‘Nature’ might imply. Her blend 
of political theory and phenomenology transposes the discussion into a different register 
giving rise to a distinction instead between earth and world. I emphasise how in Arendt’s 
account the latter term which refers to “the man-made home” must be kept, to some 
degree separate from the former, even though “the material […] earthly nature” is 
delivered “into human hands”. As she continues, “if nature and the earth generally 
constitute the condition of human life, then the world and the things of the world 
constitute the condition under which this specifically human life can be at home on earth”
(Arendt 1998: 134). Though earth is concerned primarily with the material and physical 
planet on which we live, for her, it is only through the notion of world that we can come to
dwell upon the earth.
The distinction between world and earth provides a different vantage point from which
to view Arendt’s critique of modernity—a period which she claims is characterised by 
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unique forms of alienation from both the world and the earth. Though these processes are
interrelated, importantly the concepts of world and earth grounding them remain 
essentially distinct. Through a meditation on Arendt’s notion of freedom and its 
interconnectedness to her descriptions of dissent, in this paper I consider the 
consequences of collapsing this distinction, which may act as an Arendtian warning for 
contemporary environmental movements. I suggest that Arendt can serve as a useful 
interlocutor in conversations concerning environmental politics as on the one hand, her 
account provides tools which are both critical of a romantic form of environmentalism 
that promises a return to nature. On the other, it additionally gives rise to a productive 
scepticism concerning movements which promise the overcoming of the carbon-based 
economy through vast technological developments.1 I suggest that environmentalist 
approaches may need to be weary of overlooking the distinction between world and earth,
which are different in kind for Arendt. Though they are essentially linked, she maintains 
that there is a distinction between the interwoven fabric of the world and the materiality 
of the earth; whilst the concept of ‘dwelling’ (of instituting-a-home-on-the-earth) points 
to the intersection between them, there are troubling consequences of equating the two. 
Though the success of an environmental political project may be judged upon how it 
manages to reverse and prevent the most drastic consequences of climate change on the 
Earth, I suggest it is important for any political project which aims to bring about change 
to also care for the world beyond this. Within the context of the climate crisis, I argue that
it is important to consider the artificial world as a resource analogous to the material 
earth, which is under threat and in need of care and protection. On this point Arendt can 
be of crucial importance because her thought contains a unique impulse to protect the 
world, not in the form of a classic conservative tendency but rather to preserve a space 
characterised by its contingency and by an equal openness to the possibility of 
constructive and deconstructive moments. As I will suggest, the world as a space of 
‘dwelling’ which allows us to see ourselves as belonging to the material earth is for Arendt 
essentially fragile and requires the ever-present possibility of its own undoing; a point 
which is evident from the co-relational concepts of plurality, freedom, and dissent that 
she proposes. 
Constructing this argument involves bringing together three different aspects of 
Arendt’s thought. Firstly her historical analysis of world and earth alienation (including 
her appropriation of materialist interpretations of modernity); secondly, drawing out 
what can perhaps be considered as her most important and novel contribution to 
phenomenology—a refined and nested definition of the world; and, finally her 
interrelated political definitions of freedom and dissent. From this I will argue that a key 
characteristic of Arendt’s understanding of world is characterised by it’s ever-present 
1  For reasons of brevity I do not here put forward fully constructed accounts of these schools of thought which 
are present within contemporary environmentalism. For a more detailed analysis of the roots of romanticism 
which have been inherited by the environmentalist tradition, including a focus on the individual and a 
rejection of science and civilisation, see (Pepper 1996: 188-201). Additionally, it is worth noting that recent 
UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) guidance for policy makers suggests that 
technological innovation is a key component in the post-carbon future (IPCC 2018: 20). This point is 
reflected in the fact that many UN member states have adopted domestic economic strategies with the 
intention of fostering favourable environments for investment in green technologies. 
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capacity for dissent and that this spectral characteristic of the world is worth preserving 
as our attention turns towards protecting the Earth. In doing this, I hope to highlight how 
Arendt’s thought may serve as an important touchstone for environmentalist thought 
because of the ways in which it tells a parallel narrative of the loss of the world through 
the modern age. 
In setting out this argument, I begin by considering Arendt’s account of the modern 
age and the commentary that it provides of world and earth alienation. This entails 
getting to grips with the historical analysis that she provides which brings political theory 
into dialogue with phenomenology, as Arendt draws upon a range of thinkers including 
Karl Marx and Martin Heidegger. As such this means that she maintains a distinction 
between the world and earth which interrelatedly contribute to the growth of the modern 
age. From here I follow a more recent trend within Arendtian scholarship and move into a
detailed phenomenological analysis of her concept of world, with a particular focus on 
how she goes above and beyond the more traditional interpretations of the term. Whilst 
the world may more generally be considered as a conservative concept whose primary 
function is concerned with giving stability to the human life, I suggest that a more refined 
phenomenological analysis of the term reminds us of the fact that it is equally concerned 
with change, difference and a phenomenal distancing between inhabitants, as we unpick 
the levels by which we are both of the world and actively constitutive of it. I emphasise 
these elements of Arendt’s concept of world, concerned with contingency and change, by 
looking at the term’s relation to the concept of freedom that underlies her political 
thought. This necessitates bringing the notion of world into dialogue with a wider 
network of terms which collectively characterise her notion of politics. As such her 
understanding of freedom sets certain parameters for her notion of world, a fundamental 
characteristic of which is the freedom to dissent. After exploring Arendt’s definition of 
freedom in more detail and the unorthodox interpretation of political dissent that it 
suggests, I will conclude by speculating what a world without dissent may look like in an 
effort to articulate the importance of preserving both earth and world for eco-politics.
Between materialism and phenomenology: the fabric of the world and 
materiality of the earth through the modern age
The narrative of the modern age that Arendt weaves is in part intended to redress the 
deficiencies that she perceives in the Marxist materialist account of capitalist 
development and proletariat alienation from labor. Writing at what she believes to be the 
end of the modern era, Arendt explains such an account is lacking because “the basic 
error of all materialism […] is to overlook the inevitability with which men disclose 
themselves as subjects” and to ignore the sense of a common world, a web of human 
relationships which forms an in-between (Arendt 1998: 183). This point is of vital 
importance for the way in which Arendt positions her work, bringing historical and 
materialist analysis into dialogue with phenomenology. As her account of the vita activa 
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attests, her thought attempts to walk a line somewhere between Marx’s claim that 
philosophy ought to aim at changing the world,2 and Heidegger’s retort that such a 
statement “overlooks the fact that a world change presupposes a change of the world’s 
conception” which relies upon the fact “that one interprets the world sufficiently” 
(Heidegger 1977a: 39). Against Marx she questions what she considers to be the naïve 
assumption that politics can know exactly how to change the world and bring about 
communism, a point which from the outset denies humankind’s capacity for disclosure. 
Against Heidegger, she rallies against what she perceives to be the “oblivion of praxis” 
(Villa 1996: 224-30) in Western philosophy which suffocates any attempt to retrieve the 
phenomenological conditions of political life. In this sense her exploration of the vita 
activa follows what some consider to be her anti-Platonic tendency (ibid., 82-6) to bring 
philosophy back to bear on the world of human affairs (Arendt 1990a: 102-3) and to 
reflect on the ways in which human activity is both constitutive of and conditioned by the 
world. 
Therefore, from the very outset her account of the modern age attempts to sit between 
these two traditions. As Arendt explains in The Human Condition, this blending together 
of traditions is no academic exercise but is intended “to trace back modern world 
alienation in its twofold flight from the earth into the universe and from the world into 
the self, to its origins, in order to arrive at an understanding of the nature of society” 
(Arendt 1998: 6). Furthermore, she undertakes this historical analysis in the wake of the 
totalitarian phenomenon, as “the subterranean stream of Western history has finally 
come to the surface and usurped the dignity of our tradition” (Arendt 1973: xi). Arendt 
suggests that this novel phenomenon which “aims at abolishing freedom” and 
“eliminating spontaneity in general” (ibid., 405) is a result of “the tragic fallacy” that 
undercuts the history of western thinking, which originated “in a world that was still safe”
and supposed “that there was such a thing as one human nature established for all time” 
(ibid., 456). Her argument here is that the form of instrumentalised thinking which sets 
the foundations for the rise of totalitarianism begins with reducing the human into the 
material of history, a movement which encompasses human life into the unfolding of a 
teleological form of politics. Consequently, this form of thought also requires the 
forgetting of the capacity that we have to act into history. Therefore although she praises 
Marx as a political thinker for basing his theory on a demonstrably “material human 
activity,”(Arendt 1998: 183) she also considers such an analysis to be too shallow. What is 
needed is a historical analysis which goes beyond this, which is also attentive to the ways 
in which we have been alienated from those forms of activity that allow us to realise our 
disclosive capacities. 
Arendt analyses how modern developments have led to the twofold alienation from 
both world and earth understood as distinct but interrelated concepts. She references 
three key events, the discovery of the Americas and subsequent global expansion, the 
Protestant Reformation, and the invention of the telescope, as waypoints along a path 
2  A point which is reflected in the fact that the project of work which went on to become The Human 
Condition, began with Arendt’s intention to provide a fuller commentary on the history of Marxism. See 
(Young-Bruehl 2004: 277-8).
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tending towards increasing alienation from firstly the world and secondly the earth. This 
means that there are two key phases to the story that Arendt tells which chart the 
development of what she terms modern society and modern science respectively (ibid., 
264). Although these two processes overlap she implies that there is a unique chronology 
underlying each, as alienation from the earth increasingly dominates science, world 
alienation is propagated through expropriation and wealth accumulation (ibid., 264). 
Arendt’s distinction between world and earth bears the marks of the influence that she 
draws from Heidegger.3 Though the former is a fairly common phenomenological concept
(which she modifies significantly, as  I will explore in the next section), the mechanics of 
bringing these two terms together is most prominently put forward in Heidegger’s text 
“Origin of the Work of Art”, where he defines the work like characteristic of the art-work.
Heidegger explains how the artwork sets up the world and sets forth the earth, (Heidegger
1971b: 45) a claim which establishes an important reciprocity between artificiality and 
materiality. In setting up the world, the art-work creates a space of meaning for a people, 
whilst at the same time it renders the materiality of the earth in a particular fashion, 
where “rock comes to bear and rest and so first becomes rock; metals come to glitter and 
shimmer, colors to glow, tones to sing, the word to speak” (ibid., 45). Contained within 
this distinction is the characteristic play of concealment/unconcealment that is hallmark 
of Heidegger’s thinking of Being (Villa 1996: 220-1). Whilst work sets up a world (as the 
Greek temple contributes to the establishment of the Greek culture and people), the earth 
constantly shrinks back into itself in a way that ever eludes command or mastery—it is an 
inexhaustible reserve. This thinking of earth informs Heidegger’s critique of technology 
and modernity in ways that are important for Arendt. He explains how in contrast to the 
“technological imperialism” of subjective “man as a rational being in the age of 
enlightenment” who seeks instrumental “rule over earth” (Heidegger 1977b: 152), the 
creation of the art-work “does not use up or misuse the earth as matter, but rather sets it 
free to be nothing but itself” (Heidegger 1971b: 62). The ‘work’ of the artwork therefore 
consists in the cultivation of a certain ‘free’ relationship to the earth, which does not 
instrumentalise the materials but rather brings something out in them, or renders their 
materiality in such a way that shows something new about it. In this description of the 
art-work, Heidegger’s critique of modern praxis is therefore clearly present, as the artistic
process “is much more revelatory than it is creative”, like Aristotle’s account of “the 
carpenter [who] addresses [the] wood in which the form of the finished product is already
hidden, that is, potentially present” (Sinclair 2011: 161). The form is already contained in 
the matter, the task of the artist lies not so much in instrumentalising the canvas and 
producing the artwork, but of an openness and receptivity to the material. This is where 
the ‘work’ of the art-work unfolds, in maintaining as Villa describes “a ‘strife’ between the 
‘world’ and its primordial hiddenness […] the ‘earth’” (Villa 1996: 132). 
3  Macauley provides a very helpful discussion of the broad directions of this influence suggesting that 
“Arendt’s contemplation of” these concepts “emerges directly from the shadows of Heidegger’s reflections.” 
Significantly, he also notes that “Arendt often gives these subjects a new phenomenological twist or adds a 
needed political dimension and insight where it is woefully lacking in Heidegger’s work” (Macauley 2009: 
29).
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Though Arendt will appropriate the distinction between world and earth into her 
account of the modern age, she is heavily critical of the political implications of 
Heidegger’s account. One way in which this can be witnessed is in the semantic 
uneasiness that lingers around Heidegger’s concept of “dwelling”, which plays a crucial 
role across his later works. This is a complex concept for Heidegger referring to the 
fourfold of earth, sky, mortals and divinities, which explains how human beings come to 
dwell upon the earth (Heidegger 1971a: 147-9). Each of these terms implies the other 
establishing a complex relationship between our needs for stability, permanence and 
homeliness, whilst still accepting our essential finite condition and acknowledging a more
open and contingent understanding of our relationship within nature. In the context of 
The Origin of the Work of Art, the Greek temple “holds its ground against the storm 
raging above it” (Heidegger 1971b: 41) meaning that the materiality of the earth needs to 
be rendered in the art-work in such a way that it comes to constitute a world, in which it is
possible to live. It therefore implies the founding and preservation of a space: as he 
continues, “the work moves the earth into the Open of a world and keeps it there. The 
work lets the earth be an earth.” This is, for Heidegger, how “historical man grounds his 
dwelling in the world” (ibid., 45). If we compare these descriptions to Arendt’s usage of 
the term in The Human Condition, where she refers to the world of “human artifice” 
offering “mortals a dwelling place” (Arendt 1998: 152), it is clear that she does not appeal 
to the same intricate network of concepts that is implied in the later Heidegger’s 
discussion of world and earth. For example, though Heidegger’s Greek temple may set up 
the world, notably it is “the god [that] is present in the temple” (Heidegger 1971b: 40), as 
it does not simply institute a space of refuge by which people can live upon the earth. 
Therefore it is a fundamentally different inquiry to investigate the degree to which 
Heidegger’s framework of world and earth maintains an interrelation between artificiality
and naturality. Though Arendt retains a crucial sense of “homelessness” in her references 
to dwelling, one may wonder whether this may be more reminiscent of Heidegger’s earlier
concept of thrownness.
Yet upon further analysis it becomes clearer still that the distinction between world 
and earth in Arendt’s account of the modern age distinguishes her position from 
Heidegger’s, as she is heavily critical of the political implications of his account of ‘poetic-
revealing’ which characterises the art-work (Villa 1996: 219-225). In particular, she 
rejects fundamentally the conflation of art and politics that she perceives in his later 
works, where the creation of the people and the polis is equated with the artistic revealing 
described in “Origin of the Work of Art.” In this sense, she claims that Heidegger comes to
prioritise the freedom of the earth, or Being over the freedom of the polis, or the freedom 
of the world (Arendt 1994a: 432-3). This is because the emphasis given here suggests a 
sense of politics which rests upon the moments of founding where the poet or statesman 
articulates the first principles by which a political community is brought into being (akin 
to Plato’s articulation of The Republic). Consequently, politics of this kind can be 
described as a kind of ‘plastic-art’, concerned with the fashioning of a people, a 
description which fundamentally goes against the form of political action that Arendt 
advocates. The point here is that such a version of politics falls back into a teleocratic 
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conception, where the political community is established for a particular end or with a 
certain ideal in mind. As Villa describes this, “the result is that the fashioning or 
‘fictioning’ of the community in conformity with an ideal of Justice is transformed into an 
exercise in self-production” (Villa 1996: 247). Following Arendt’s phenomenology will 
help us to see how her emphasis on the plurality of political action disrupts this account 
and how it highlights the dehumanising dimensions of such a form of politics, as it 
hollows out the claim that there can be such an ‘organic’ tie between any members of a 
community. Additionally, it foregrounds the potential damages done by revealing a 
question at the heart of the theme of community, which Heidegger’s account troublingly 
overlooks. As Villa further explains “the conundrum is simply put: the people, who do not 
yet exist as a people, must somehow always already be enough of a subject in order to 
author or fashion themselves qua community” (ibid., 247). Consequently, the 
construction of a people in this sense often requires the enforcement of one particular 
way of life over the whole population and the suppression of genuine political plurality in 
the service of an imposed consensus; a form of politics which fans the flames of all racist, 
chauvinist and colonial ideologies. We can stretch this same point out into two different 
directions: on the one hand, it objects to forms of politics stemming from a romantic 
desire to shape a world more in harmony with nature, characterised by the ideal of a 
‘return to nature’. On the other, it carries with it a warning about the dangers of applying 
a more utopian logic to the construction of the polis, which promises to overcome natural 
limitations and to settle the question of climate change by liberating the capitalist 
economy from its carbon dependency. In both instances a form of productive techne is 
appealed to, where the real task of building the community falls to a particular class of 
people. Be it the poets, the artists, or the statesman, the political task is one of envisioning
the will of the people into a collective identity, or a volk. 
In drawing out such a critique, I suggest that we can begin to see one key way in which 
the distinction between world and earth operates differently for Arendt, which also brings
to the fore her concerns about collapsing the artificial fabric of the former into the 
materiality of the latter. As was suggested above in the discussion of "dwelling", the 
constitution of the world for Arendt points towards a drastically different conception of 
politics than Heidegger; by extension, I suggest that this implies a very different 
relationship with the materiality of the earth. This point is hinted at in her description of 
the twofold processes of world and earth alienation, where she writes as follows,
When the immensity of available space on earth was discovered, the […] 
shrinkage of the globe began, until eventually in our world […] each man is as 
much an inhabitant of the earth as he is an inhabitant of his country. Men now 
live in an earth-wide continuous whole where even the notion of distance, still 
inherent in the most perfectly unbroken contiguity of parts, has yielded before 
the onslaught of speed. Speed has conquered space […] it has made distance 
meaningless, for no significant part of a human life—years, months, or even 
weeks—is any longer necessary to reach any point on the earth. (Arendt 1998: 
250)
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I suggest that Arendt’s claim here actually implies two different senses of ‘distance’, 
one worldly and one earthly, both of which have been significantly devalued by the 
processes of alienation that she describes. Though her description accords broadly with 
something like a critique of accelerationism, she importantly phrases two different 
processes of acceleration, which refer to world and earth separately. To tackle the latter of
these first, earth alienation refers to the growth of modern science specifically. Stemming 
from the Copernican realisation that the Earth is no longer at the centre of the universe, 
Arendt claims science reached an Archimedean point where “we always handle nature 
from a point in the universe outside the earth.” Through this process, the Earth loses its 
significance as a planetary condition of human existence and is instead instrumentalised 
into mere raw-material, entirely malleable to science. As she continues, “still bound to the
earth through the human condition, we have found a way to act on the earth and within 
terrestrial nature as though we dispose of it from outside” (ibid., 262). Arendt suggests 
that as we become increasingly alienated from the earth “it means that we no longer feel 
bound even to the sun […] we move freely in the universe choosing our point of reference 
whatever it may be convenient for a specific purpose” (ibid., 263). The transformation 
therefore does not relate to a specific location (i.e. the planet Earth per se) but instead to 
the orientation that modern science takes towards geographical space and materiality 
more generally.4 This escape from geographical space, Arendt claims, is in part due to the 
foundations of modern science and to the method of Cartesian doubt, that suggests we 
can abstract from the world of sense data to the certainty of the mind. Such a manoeuvre 
prefigures “the modern ideal of reducing terrestrial sense data and movements to 
mathematical symbols” (ibid., 265). This twofold escape from the earth and retreat into 
abstract rationalism characterises the transformation of space that takes place through 
the process. Earth alienation “is typified strangely by an historical expansion of known 
geographic and physical space which brings about, ironically, a closing-in process that 
shrinks and abolishes distance” (Macauley 2009: 22). The further we drive to expand the 
boundaries of human life beyond the planet the more we retreat into the realm of 
abstractions. At the same time the growth of abstract space instigated by our alienation 
from the earth is also the process by which we shrink back into the certainty of the self. 
What persists throughout this twofold movement is the divorce between the materiality of
the earth and the rational; or rather the nullification of the former by the latter. Much like
the descriptions of technology and planetary imperialism offered by Heidegger, as this 
process progresses the material space in which we live increasingly comes under the yoke 
of oppressive rationality and instrumentality (Heidegger 1977b: 152).
Though the process of earth alienation and the deformation of ‘distance’ that it 
describes is related to the same historical analysis that sets out the process of world 
alienation, Arendt importantly maintains a key distinction between these two terms. 
4  Macauley notes how Arendt’s descriptions of earth alienation bear close resemblance to Heidegger’s remarks 
in ‘The Thing’ about the abolition of distance failing to bring about the nearness of things. (Macauley 2009: 
28-9) However, although Heidegger discusses the world in this text and processes of “worlding”, the 
discussion implicates his account of the fourfold. Therefore, it cannot be said that there is the same 
distinction between two different types of “distance” as there is no separation, at least in the Arendtian sense 
between the natural and the artificial (Heidegger 1971c: 178-80).
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Unlike the complex interplay suggested by Heidegger's account of the truth of the art-
work and of dwelling in the fourfold, the question of 'home' means something 
fundamentally different for her. Arendt’s discussion of world alienation indeed grapples 
with the themes of dwelling and homelessness, but it strikes a different tone by 
highlighting the dynamics by which certain groups of people have been deprived of their 
place in the world and exposed to the exigencies of life (Arendt 1998: 255). The modern 
age, according to Arendt, has deformed the artificial world in such a way that has eclipsed 
the “common public world” leading to “the formation of the worldless mentality of 
modern ideological mass movements” (ibid., 257). This claim pulls us into the heart of a 
point of contention between Arendt and Heidegger on the constitution of the world. For 
her, the political task of instituting the world is not simply a matter of founding a place in 
which a ‘people’ can say that they belong together. In order to resist the process of world 
alienation, such a space would need to preserve the phenomenon of ‘distance’ that she 
describes, an element of her thinking that crucially separates her understanding of 
politics from a teleocratic or ‘plastic-art’ politics. Just as technological imperialism has 
come to exploit the earth, such a politics could come to also dominate the world by 
instrumentalising the space in order to build it in the particular image of the people. 
Rather still, it places the emphasis of setting up the world solely into the hands of the 
artists or the statesman, whose primary responsibility lies not to the community but 
rather to the work. In such a description the polis is fashioned according to the work, 
meaning that the world and the space of dwelling is but a result of this founding process; 
whilst the founder sets up the world, the only duty that falls down to inhabitants is the 
task of conserving it as it is. Therefore, for the vast majority of people the world comes to 
be seen not as a political problem to be engaged with but a state of affairs to be tended to, 
to be maintained and preserved. Here I suggest that a world tinged with a sense of 
fatalism may, under an Arendtian diagnosis, stem from a failure to fully appreciate the 
distinction between the artificial fabric of the world and the materiality of the earth, 
because it fails to see how these distinct logics of distance operate within them.
Whilst the process of earth alienation shows the complex shrinking of geographical 
distance and expansion of abstract geometric space, the abolition of distance which 
characterises world alienation suggests something altogether different for Arendt, 
distinguished by its notably political consequences. To acknowledge the Arendtian 
account is to see the equal importance of protecting these two distinct things but to also 
see them as separate demands that we face. The artificial fabric of the world must be 
something fundamentally different to the materiality of the earth and therefore any 
environmental movement worthy of warranting the title ‘eco-politics’ in the Arendtian 
sense, will need to attribute equal importance to the task of preserving the former in its 
artificiality in addition to conserving the latter. Whilst the climate catastrophe forces us to
re-think the ways that we may conserve the earth and our connection to it, the modern 
deformation of world raises a different problem. To understand what is at stake in the loss
of the world, we need to take a renewed phenomenological appreciation of Arendt’s 
concept, which can help us to see how this form of distance operates and further, to see 
how we may be able to preserve it. 
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Arendt’s phenomenology of world: the artificial in-between
Peter Gratton’s recent suggestion that Arendt’s thought from at least Origins onwards 
has been motivated by phenomenology highlights how her account of “totalitarianism 
operates by a sort of horrific parody of metaphysics.” As he explains, totalitarianism refers
to a closure of political space, that “goes beyond just the loss of ‘plurality’ marked by 
lawless tyrannies”,  instead utilizing terror to create “one Man” and not “men in the 
plural” (Gratton 2021: 99-100). His claim here builds upon the fact that her work is 
phenomenological, in the basic sense that it “accepts the premise that holds various 
phenomenological accounts together, namely, that there is no Being beneath 
appearances” (ibid., 98). The thread that he traces through her work is her commitment 
to the notion of a common world, which designates a public, shared space of appearances.
Though commentators have long observed that Arendt’s work carries basic traces of 
phenomenology within it, Gratton’s idea of approaching her as a pre-dominantly 
‘phenomenological’ thinker reflects a trend within scholarship that has become 
increasingly popular in recent years. There are good reasons for considering Arendt as a 
phenomenologist, firstly because, as Gratton indicates, it shows a continuity which cuts 
through the heart of the most important aspects of her thought, from beginning to end, 
threading together her discussions on the concept of world, totalitarianism and the 
network of political concepts she espouses. In the next section I will continue this thread 
by looking at how it relates to the concepts of freedom and dissent specifically. However, a
second benefit of considering Arendt’s work as primarily phenomenological, and what I 
will focus on in this section, is seeing the originality of her thought as it is held up against 
the background of the broader phenomenological tradition. Whilst she borrows much 
from the tradition to supplement her historical analysis, Arendt’s discussion of world 
modifies the significance of the term in several important ways by highlighting the 
uniquely political dimensions of intersubjective existence; a contribution which warrants 
her inclusion as an original contributor to the field (ibid., 98). By approaching her work 
through phenomenology, we can see exactly how she builds plurality into the concept and 
how through this notion she preserves a sense of distance at the root of the world. 
Furthermore, in doing this she is able to emphasise the tragic elements and politically 
catastrophic aspects that may come to pass if we lose this sense of the world, 
characterised as a complex composite, an in-between space capable of housing genuine 
political plurality.
To set out how she arrives at this position, Arendt incorporates Heidegger’s critical 
appropriation of Husserl, through the way that she builds upon the former’s analysis of 
world, worldliness and worldhood. In Being and Time, Heidegger sets out his intentions 
to go beyond the Husserlian sense of the life-world by proposing a more primordial 
notion of worldhood which characterises Dasein’s existence. According to Heidegger, the 
“ontologico-existential concept of worldhood” (Heidegger 1962: 93) is neither the world 
conceived as a composite totality of present-at-hand things, nor an all compassing sense 
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of world expressing the Being of a multiplicity of entities denoting the realm of possible 
objects within the subject field (as in the ‘world’ of mathematics). On top of this, neither is
it merely the “life-world” considered as  “a ‘public’ we-world, or one’s ‘own’ closest 
(domestic) environment” (ibid., 93). Rather, Heidegger’s notion of worldhood stresses the
dimensions by which Dasein is already-within-the-world, essentially belonging to it, so 
that any attempt to phenomenologically investigate the structures through which the 
world arrives for consciousness must already depart from this position (ibid., 93).
A similar point can be seen in Arendt’s rather harsh critique of Husserl (Arendt 1994b:
167).5 However her concept of world also takes us beyond the Heideggerian reformulation
in two specific ways. Firstly, her discussion of the ‘worldly’ realm of human affairs is 
fundamentally different to Heidegger’s sense of worldhood because there is a key change 
in emphasis from ourselves as appearing beings in the world, immersed in object and tool
relations, to the intersubjective sense in which the world is created through interaction 
with others. Secondly, though she incorporates motifs of Heidegger’s critique of 
modernity, Arendt marries together the reciprocal points that because the world “can be 
actualized on different levels and with different emphases,” to “destroy it means to 
destroy the possibilities of human existence” (Loidolt 2018: 101) in a way that is 
suspiciously absent from his thought. 
To help address these transformations in more detail, Sophie Loidolt has identified 
that Arendt’s thought actually contains three interrelated concepts of world (ibid., 98-9). 
The first of these she refers to as an “appearing world”, that posits “the primacy of world 
before Dasein” (ibid., 98): there is no beyond the fundamental space of appearance to 
which we belong inescapably. The second concept is identified as the “first in-between 
world” (ibid., 98), which can be considered as the world in a practical sense. It refers to 
the world of objects and objectivity and is the domain that Arendt specifies when she 
refers to the activities of world-building. In this sense of world, the emphasis is on 
stability and durability; we are constituted by the world we inhabit and through it we can 
dwell upon the Earth. Over and above these more Heideggerian senses of the term, 
Loidolt identifies the third concept as what she calls the “second in-between” which refers
to the political “with-world” (ibid., 99) that Arendt intends to preserve. This second in-
between differs from the first, as its phenomenological emphasis lies in its intersubjective 
constitution, it underlies how the world is a network of relationships which is “not 
tangible” (Arendt 1998: 182) but no less real. Though it may be comprised of invisible 
threads, this second in-between, which consists of the push and pull of intersubjective 
relations, contributes equally to Arendt’s concept of world. The second in-between, 
therefore highlights how these relationships are constitutive of the world. 
Implicit in this third concept is Loidolt’s claim that Arendt’s commitment to 
phenomenology means that she affirms the view that the world is comprised of individual 
first-person perspectives, a point which she suggest protects the plurality of the world 
5  Although it is also worth noting that it has been convincingly argued that Arendt misrepresents Husserl on 
this point. See Loidolt 2018: 26.
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from falling into a mere superficial plurality (which could just mean the diversity of 
political opinions or positions in a given discourse). Instead Loidolt suggests that the 
phenomenological commitment to the first-person perspective is a prerequisite of the 
experience of genuine political plurality (Loidolt 2018: 83-4). Additionally, this 
phenomenological emphasis also heavily colours the way that she interprets Arendt’s 
description of the ‘common world’ as an ‘in-between’. The effects of Loidolt’s 
interpretation can perhaps be best seen by considering Arendt’s metaphor of the table for 
the commonality of the world, 
To live together in the world means essentially that a world of things is 
between those who have it in common, as a table is located between those who 
sit around it; the world, like every in-between, relates and separates men at 
the same time. The public realm, as the common world, gathers us together 
and yet prevents our falling over each other, so to speak. 6 (Arendt 1998: 52)
When read through the phenomenological commitment to the first-person 
perspective, the table quite clearly here stands in for the distance that is maintained 
between the individual experience of the inhabitants of the common world. This is an 
important point to consider as it will be crucial for the definitions of freedom and dissent 
that I will explore later. Whilst we will return to this point, we should note how this 
commitment to the first-person perspective characterises the way that we understand the 
artificial fabric of the world and how it maintains a notion of distance that is crucial to 
Arendt’s understanding of the term, a point which is seemingly absent in Heidegger’s 
notion of a ‘people’.  
As Loidolt further points out, “these three notions of ‘world’ do not point to three 
different ‘worlds,’ but designate two interrelated fields of meaning within the one 
appearing world” (Loidolt 2018: 99). It is this nested understanding of world which 
presents Arendt’s unique contribution to phenomenology, as,
She conceives of human beings neither predominantly as world-constituting 
beings (Husserl), nor predominantly as equipment users in the world 
(Heidegger), nor predominantly as artists interwoven with the flesh of the world
(Merleau-Ponty)—but in all of these dimensions with an additional strong 
emphasis on the worldliness of acting together and appearing before one 
another. The world in its different dimensions is thus kept alive and made 
tangible by […] human activities, and especially by the combination of poiesis 
[Work] and praxis [Action]. The latter provides the necessary components for 
the constitution of a cultural and historical world, which specifically describes 
the second in-between. (ibid., 99)
Phenomenology here helps us to break apart Arendt’s definition of world, in order to 
see the complex composite space that it refers to. This refined definition allows us to 
6  Emphasis added.
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understand how Arendt frames her concerns about the degradation of the world in a way 
that goes beyond Heideggerian and other previous phenomenological attempts to explore 
the consequences of such a loss. In one direction she leans into Heidegger, appropriating 
his point that where “Dasein’s facticity is such that its Being-in-the-world has always 
dispersed [zerstreut] itself or even split itself into definite ways of Being-in” (Heidegger 
1962: 83). When Arendt claims that the modern world is increasingly worldless, this 
permits her, to make an existential claim rather than a categorical judgment, which is to 
say “it is not just a psychological ‘feeling’ people have which is caused and hence 
explained by some prior series of events” but “a shift in what it means to be, a shift in the 
underlying experience that we have of human existence” (Sandra & Lewis Hinchman 
1984: 198). However, in a separate direction, her concept of world goes beyond this 
because it sets up the task at hand for her, “the necessity for a new political philosophy” 
which overcomes the “philosophers […] estrangement from the everyday life of human 
affairs” (Arendt 1990a: 103). This stems from the realisation that the world consists of 
intersubjective action, which provides both the stability and durability of the ‘first in-
between’ but also appeals to the “actualized plurality”7 (Loidolt 2018: 189) of political 
action that characterises the ‘second in-between.’ Arendt’s historical analysis of modern 
society and the forms of expropriation and wealth accumulation that leads to world 
alienation is therefore attentive to both of these claims, as it points out that the loss of the 
world is also a loss of our capacity to make and re-create the world through 
intersubjective relations. This comes to be seen as a space which, if we follow the 
phenomenological analysis, mediates our commonality through a notion of distance. 
Phenomenology, therefore helps us to see what is distinct in the modern loss of the world,
which is separate from our alienation from the earth. In the remaining sections, I would 
like to explore how phenomenology too can help us to understand how Arendt’s more 
overtly political work may, in the face of the environmental crisis, preserve the world. 
Freedom and the world: ‘the paradoxical plurality of unique beings’
If a renewed phenomenological appreciation of Arendt’s concept of world helps us to 
see how it is distinctive from the earth, then her political works provide further 
clarifications about how eco-political formations can remain mindful of preserving such a 
space, ensuring that it is not drowned out in the pursuit of a more sustainable form of life 
on the planet. The main thrust behind this interpretation is, I believe, the connection 
between the concept of world and the ever-present possibility of dissent which can be 
found via the notion of freedom that she endorses. Arendt describes freedom as “the 
7  This is the term used by Loidolt to refer to the uniquely political form of intersubjective interactions that 
Arendt’s phenomenology creates the space for. By keeping politics in the mode of praxis, away from 
teleological conceptions of politics and away from a form of poesis, she argues this preserves a form of 
encounter between first-person perspectives which both maintains alterity at the heart of intersubjective 
relations and which evades falling into the trap of seeing the Other as a ‘what’ as opposed to a ‘who’. Loidolt 
draws out many of the ethical significances of such an interpretation and considers this to be a novel 
contribution to the field of phenomenology.
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raison d’etre of politics” (Arendt 1968: 146), as a complex notion which is vital to her 
understanding of political intersubjectivity and politics as occurring in a space of 
appearance; I suggest that this means that the concept has both political and 
phenomenological significance. She takes great pains to distinguish her notion of freedom
from any definition that equates it with an “inner feeling” considered as “the inward space
into which men may escape from external coercion and feel free” (ibid., 146)—a point 
which is reflected in her view that the individual will has nothing to do with political 
freedom.8 Instead she suggests that such interpretations of freedom are derivative of a 
more originary public sense of the term, explaining how, 
We first become aware of freedom or its opposite in our intercourse with 
others, not in the intercourse with ourselves. Before it became an attribute of 
the thought or a quality of the will, freedom was understood to be the free man’s
status, which enabled him to move, to get away from home, to go out into the 
world and to meet other people in deed and word. (ibid., 148) 
This means that for Arendt, freedom operates as a kind of enabling condition of 
politics rather than a particular theme within political discourses. Freedom is vital to the 
very occurrence of politics, as opposed to being “one among the many problems and 
phenomena of the political realm properly speaking, such as justice, or power, or 
equality” (ibid., 146). In contrast to descriptions of politics that centre around the goal of 
liberating oppressed groups, she claims, “freedom […] only seldom—in times of crisis or 
revolution—becomes the direct aim of political action” as it is “actually the reason that 
men live together in political organization at all” (ibid., 146).  
Freedom for Arendt requires consideration as an integral part of a conceptual web that
she constructs, that links to her discussions of “action, politics, public space, speech, 
plurality […] equality or isonomy, and power” which are “all interwoven […] into an 
integrated whole” (Bernstein 1983: 207). Each of these parts refer to different 
characteristics of the type of space and web of intersubjective encounters that typify her 
understanding of politics. Moreover, freedom is linked to the concept of world because it 
implies a certain logic, which configures the abovementioned network of concepts in such 
a way that political intersubjectivity can occur. This is reflected in the fact that “not every 
form of human intercourse and not every kind of community is characterized by freedom”
and that “where men live together but do not form a body politic […] the factors ruling 
their actions and conduct are not freedom but the necessities of life and concern for its 
8  This is an incredibly important point which has implications for her definition and defence of dissent. 
Arendt’s definition of dissent is fundamentally different in kind to more traditional liberal arguments which 
stress the importance of the capacities of the individual, basing their defences of rights and freedoms around 
such a notion, for example Isiah Berlin’s concept of negative liberty. As the will is apolitical for Arendt, the 
ability to dissent cannot come from some kind of inner conviction but only from a form of collective 
phenomenon. Here I suggest that the most profound way that this collective phenomenon can be understood 
is by considering the ways in which it plays on the fragility and non-foundational nature of her understanding
of the world. The right to dissent is not simply the right of an individual to withdraw from or object to politics 
but is a condition of worldly political life, in the sense that it serves as a criterion of the world—the present 
possibility of dissent maintains the world’s fragility, its openness and its incompleteness. 
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preservation” (Arendt 1968: 148). The establishment of a space for freedom supposes 
certain conditions to be met, so that such interaction can occur between genuinely equal 
perspectives.9 For Arendt this requires the construction of equality, hence the root 
concept of isonomia that she draws on so that there is a reciprocity between the speech 
and action of those inhabiting the space. Étienne Balibar describes this point as “Arendt’s 
institutionalism” which is “not of the standard version” but is a reinforcement of the point
that “rights are not, or not primarily, ‘qualities’ of individual subjects” but “qualities that 
individuals grant each other […] whenever they form a ‘common world’” (Balibar 2007: 
333). Freedom plays a key role in this unorthodox understanding of institutionalism, as 
for Arendt it is embedded into the logic of equality. The equality established between the 
members of the polis requires freedom because it must be mutually and freely granted 
between them. It is this dual interplay of freedom and equality through the notion of 
isonomia that guarantees the freedom of the world that Arendt describes.
It is worth pausing here to consider further how this definition of freedom shapes our 
understanding of her concept of world by returning to the phenomenology. As Loidolt has
noted, the network of these concepts (of which freedom is of vital importance) points 
towards, 
A special perspective, which is neither a ‘classic’ phenomenological first-
person perspective (singular), nor an objectivist third-person perspective. 
Rather, it is a genuine perspective of intersubjectivity—the perspective from 
which social facts, stories, and histories can be conceived. […] Arendt therefore 
approaches the issue differently, which does not mean giving up on [the] first-
person or second-person perspective, but […] integrating them into the starting 
point of the publicness of appearance. What results are the plural perspectives 
of all those who share a world where doer/s and deed/s appear. This pluralized 
perspectiveness of a shared world is primordial in character since it can never 
be derived from an addition or fusion of single first-person perspectives. Rather,
it forms an in-between, which is filled by stories […] all perceived in this arena 
of multiperspectival public appearance. (Loidolt 2018: 200)
This means that freedom occupies a somewhat strange but vital position within 
Arendt’s thought, as it can be said to have a tangible worldly reality under certain 
circumstances when it is made to appear in the world through action. Freedom therefore 
does not itself appear as a political concept but is made to appear in certain 
9  In her response to Seyla Benhabib’s criticism of Arendt’s “phenomenological essentialism”, Loidolt explores 
the idea that her descriptions refer to differing dynamic “spaces of meaning” rather than a prescriptive 
account of human activities and their proper place in the world. Her use of the term spaces of meaning is 
intended to capture how “certain conditions have to be met to make an activity possible” so that these spaces 
develop “a certain logic […] which functions in an orientating and structuring way.” Plurality is one such 
“meaning space” that Loidolt describes and the logic it entails requires the suppression of urgency and 
necessity, “in order to unfold as a space of freedom, creativity, and the unexpected.” Though I do not have 
space here to lay out this argument in full, it is on this basis that Loidolt argues that Arendt’s commitment to 
phenomenology is not different from the approaches of other philosophical schools of thought in that she 
aims to “state more than contingent facts” by exploring these “quasi-transcendental” spaces of meaning 
which interpret “‘the phenomena of history, sociology, and culture’ as world opening” (Loidolt 2018: 124-43).
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configurations of intersubjective relations. It consists of a blended space, which is neither 
entirely comprised through the action and speech of individuals nor the composite 
resulting tapestry of these words and deeds. Put differently, the artificial fabric of the 
common world integrates the first and second person perspectives by emphasising how 
these positions are both equally present in the process of actually appearing in a 
genuinely common in-between space which characterises freedom. The reality of the 
world consequently cannot be said to be weighted in favour of either side of this equation,
it is neither the product of multiple first-person perspectives looking on the same space 
and neither does it efface the constitutive role that the first-person perspective plays on it.
Therefore, freedom is intrinsically connected to her discussion of plurality as it is 
conditioned by the very appearance of pluralised perspectives, at once disclosing them as 
the perspective of an individual but at the same time passing them through the prism of 
pluralism, of appearing amongst others; thus framing them as each unique in relation to 
their plural context. It therefore “comprises the paradoxical characteristics of equality and
distinction, implying a plural uniqueness” (Loidolt 2018: 156). This is what distinguishes 
the political condition from others: our otherness from everything else that exists and our 
distinctness from everything else that lives is transposed into uniqueness, by the 
“paradoxical plurality of unique beings” (Arendt 1998: 176). The interplay of equality and 
distinction is of vital importance here because it prevents the  form of “levelling” equality 
that Arendt is explicitly concerned about in her engagement with Marx and modernity 
(Arendt 2002: 300-307). Furthermore it is for her the paradox of plurality that 
constitutes the fabric of the free world because it relates individuals to one another whilst 
simultaneously respecting that there exists a distance between them; the in-between is 
the scene of this play of equality and distinction. Freedom is therefore concerned with 
how we appear and refers to a configuration of politics which is realized in its own 
unfolding, as it “expresses precisely this enactive quality in contrast to a static and 
substantive indication like ‘house’ or ‘stone’” (Loidtolt 2018: 51). As Arendt explains, this 
means that “man does not possess freedom so much as he, or better his coming into the 
world, is equated with the appearance of freedom” (Arendt 1968: 167). The immanent 
logic of political action that she describes where a ‘principle’ which is “much too general 
to describe particular goals […] becomes fully manifest only in the performing act itself” 
places the emphasis of freedom in its actualization. The appearance of freedom therefore 
coincides with the political act (ibid., 152-3). As Loidolt has further noted, this amounts to
the fact that freedom, plurality and the configuration of intersubjective relations entail “a 
contingent, non-necessary event” and that this state of “actualized plurality is thus always 
faced with the spectre of it sliding back into mere possibility.” Or furthermore it is 
“severely threatened by those who seek to destroy even this possibility” (Loidolt 2018: 51).
When Arendt warns of a world where freedom has been suppressed, where “freedom 
lacks the world space to make its appearance” (Arendt 1968: 148-9) she warns of the 
effects of political attempts to contract the complex artificial fabric of intersubjective 
relations that constitute the world. I suggest that the loss of Arendt’s common world can 
be equated with the loss of this distance which is required by her mutual concepts of 
freedom and plurality. As freedom does not exist in something so tangible, the question 
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is: how can Arendt’s understanding contribute positively to politics and to movements 
that wish to respond to the contemporary environmental crisis?
Eco-politics: preserving a world of dissent
In order to answer this question, I would like to draw on Arendt’s claim that “freedom 
always implies freedom of dissent” (Arendt 1972b: 78) to suggest that the task of 
protecting the artificial fabric of the world might amount to preserving our capacities to 
dissent from its givenness. I argue that this ever-present possibility of Arendt’s world, 
orients it towards the contingency that she suggests politics proper entails. Dissent 
therefore can operate as a critical dimension of Arendt’s phenomenology of world, which 
may serve as a useful concept for eco-political movements who wish to build a more just 
and sustainable world, who would be hesitant to utilise a reference to an organic or 
naturalistic tie, that can be used to re-anchor our existence on the planet. Instead, I 
suggest that preserving a world of dissent may constitute a kind of parallel re-
enchantment with the artificiality of the world as an inexhaustible reserve, analogous to 
the earth, which demands politics for its deconstruction and subsequent reconstruction, 
and which furthermore acknowledges the groundless task of instituting a community. 
Arendt most thoroughly sets out this aspect of her thought in the essay on “Civil 
Disobedience.” Whilst towards the end of the essay she turns her attention to focus 
specifically on the phenomenon of American civil disobedience, what I would like to draw 
out of her argumentation are the ways in which she links the question of world to the 
possibility of dissent (which is a distinct aspect of her concept of freedom). In this regard, 
the essay contains a fascinating meditation upon the necessity of both change and 
stability for her account of the human condition. Supporting her claims about the 
accelerating rates of expropriation, Arendt maintains that “change is constant, inherent in
the human condition, but [that] the velocity of change is not. It varies greatly from 
country to country, from century to century” (Arendt 1972a: 102). She asserts that it is 
only in the modern age where we developed a notion of “change for change’s sake, under 
the name of progress” and further that “ours is perhaps the first century in which the 
speed of change in the things of the world has outstripped the change of its inhabitants” 
(ibid., 78). In such remarks Arendt seems to be critical of accelerationism, suggesting that
we may be becoming fundamentally unable to adjust to the rate of technological and 
economic development that extends through the 20th century. This would align her with a 
more conservative tendency to call for a project of restoration which seeks to reinstate 
and preserve historical values. However, when we return to the phenomenological 
content of her account it becomes clear that she is attempting to establish a more nuanced
position. Rather, what interests her primarily is how the political dimensions of our 
worldly existence traverse between these two tendencies. As she describes,
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Man’s urge for change and his need for stability have always balanced and 
checked each other, our current vocabulary, which distinguishes between two 
factions, the progressives and the conservatives, indicates a state of affairs in 
which this balance has been thrown out of order. No civilization—the man-made
artifact to house successive generations—would ever have been possible without
a framework of stability, to provide the wherein for the flux of change. (ibid., 79)
Though Arendt here writes about customs, manners, habits, regulating legal systems 
and institutions, these aspects of human life correlate to the notion of world; they are the 
‘man-made’ elements which allow us to dwell upon the earth. Pushing against theorists 
who would maintain that the law is a wholly restraining force, she re-affirms her 
commitment to human disclosivity claiming that such a misconception comes from the 
perception of those living in a society of rapid change, where the law appears to be out of 
date or outmoded for the society it governs over. Instead she places the emphasis of 
change firmly within the sphere of political action, pointing out that it is due to years of 
collective action, organizing, striking and often violent disobedience that we have 
established bodies of labor legislation. On the basis of these observations, she re-affirms 
that laws only “stabilize and legalise change once it has occurred” because “the change 
itself is always the result of the extra-legal action” (ibid., 80). Change here refers to an 
inherently political phenomenon; namely political action’s capacity to bring about a 
change in the constitution of the world, a point which establishes a certain fluidity to the 
artificial fabric of the world.
This claim goes against more common interpretations of Arendt’s concept of world, 
associated with stability and a conservative tendency, by inserting dissent into the heart 
of it. It is of crucial importance for the defence of disobedience that she offers, and her 
argument that the consent required to establish a political community always implies 
dissent.10 Additionally, it is an aspect of key significance for the form of world that she 
endorses, writing,
One who knows that he may dissent knows also that he somehow consents 
when he does not dissent. Consent as it is implied in the right to dissent […] 
spells out and articulates the tacit consent given in exchange for the 
community’s tacit welcome of new arrivals, of the inner immigration through 
which it constantly renews itself. (Arendt 1972a: 88)
10  Arendt provides a good description of the type of ‘fictions’ which bind social groups and communities 
together in On Revolution, where she distinguishes between a contract of reciprocity and presupposed 
equality established between the mutual promises of members and the type of contract that is established in 
the constitution of a new government. In the former power is replayed back to the members of the contract as
“such an alliance gathers together the isolated strength of the allied partners and binds them into a new 
power structure.” In the latter, vertical contract however, each member “gives up his isolated strength and 
power” over to the delegated ruler. Such a description helps us to further see how dissent is operative in 
relation to consent; each term implies the other because both pull on the reciprocal connections that allow a 
collective ‘fiction’ to be constructed through the mutual promises and equalities that establish the political 
community. As we shall see further dissent is the ever-present possibility of that community to call into 
question its own fictional origins. See (Arendt 1990b: 170). 
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Therefore it is the ever-present possibility of dissent which actually assures the 
openness and contingency of the free world for Arendt, as it takes an intersubjective 
construction that prefigures or sets the conditions of its own undermining. I suggest that 
the possibility of dissent is a key part of the artificial fabric of the world that she seeks to 
protect because its presence relies on the fact that there is freedom, distance and 
plurality, allowing the world to exist between our tendencies for change and stability. 
Drawing such a conclusion does not downplay the role of consent in Arendt’s account of 
politics, which occupies a place of key theoretical significance, meaning that people can 
“act in concert” (Arendt 1998: 179). Furthermore, consent is also vitally important 
practically speaking for the formation of political movements, which must harness the 
power of consensual political action in order to form the kind of coalitions necessary for 
politics. Rather, my focus on the linkage between her descriptions of dissent and her 
concept of world is to suggest that an openness to or presence of the possibility of dissent 
plays a democratically constitutive role, in that it can act as a kind of negative barometer 
which can be used to measure the presence of plurality within our political institutions—
something which is a prerequisite of genuinely democratic society. In order to experience 
the world as free we need to experience the sense that it could be different, that it implies 
a plurality of possibilities and that we have a practical openness to these possibilities. It 
implies that a key ingredient in Arendt’s understanding of world is its fragility—it needs to
remain acutely aware of its own precariousness. The protection of the free world 
necessitates the preservation of dissent as an ever-present possibility. This fragile world 
implies something fundamentally different to the ‘world’ discussed by Heidegger, as the 
world is not just a founded space in which a ‘people’ can commune but is instead a space 
permeated by difference and distance.
By bringing together Arendt’s phenomenology of world, her entangled definition of 
freedom which implies plurality and equality, and finally this description of dissent, we 
can understand what contemporary environmental political movements may need to 
protect in order to preserve the world in the Arendtian sense of the term. Freedom 
implies dissent and in the more originary sense it also refers to something wholly other 
than the freedom of the individual will. The implication of this point is that the political 
phenomenon of dissent cannot simply be equated with the functioning of an individual’s 
inner conviction to withdraw their consent or object, (Petherbridge 2016: 978-9) but with 
a more public and collective phenomenon. I suggest that Arendt’s thought opens out into 
a unique interpretation of the term dissent by understanding it within the context of an 
intersubjective construction. The phenomenological interpretation of world that Arendt 
offers is much more complex than a simple space into which individuals can either opt 
into or opt out of; we are fundamentally both of the world and our political 
intersubjectivity serves to constitute the world. The world is a multiperspectival space of 
appearance, it is comprised of first person-perspectives and yet it transcends beyond a 
mere fusion of views. Additionally, it contains both a first in-between, consisting of an 
objective and practical world, and a second in-between, through which our plurality 
constitutes a with-world. This refined phenomenological understanding of the world 
helps us to see precisely how dissent operates for Arendt and how the world may exist 
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between the dual tendencies for stability and change. By relying on the first and third 
levels of the world—pointing to a phenomenal space of appearance and the manner in 
which we are bound together in the ways that we constitute the world—dissent can throw 
into question the second level by articulating how the objective world, which provides 
stability, may be under threat. The key point that I would like to emphasise is that the 
dissenter never acts alone and their desire “to change the world” (Arendt 1972a: 77) 
carries with it certain phenomenological conditions for their action. The dissenter 
necessarily pulls on the threads of the world which binds them to others. Dissenters 
manipulate the artificial fabric of the world in such a way that amplifies the distance 
between its inhabitants by appealing to the concepts of plurality and freedom. In this 
manner, political intersubjectivity serves as the motor which allows us to transcend the 
mere ‘givenness’ of the world, instead revealing its expansiveness, contingency and 
inexhaustibility.
This distinction between the materiality of the earth and the artificiality of the world 
may be a useful point to recall in contemporary debates concerning environmentalism. As
the pressure mounts to transfer towards a global post-carbon economy, our attention 
turns to the ways in which we can reverse and bring to a halt the destructive processes of 
expropriation that have accelerated the present environmental crisis. To one degree or 
another, this involves fundamentally re-orientating our relationship to the Earth and 
imagining ways we can live on the planet beyond our present form so that we no longer 
unsustainably exploit natural reserves and produce increasing levels of greenhouse gas 
emissions, resulting in irreversible damage to ecological systems. Within both the present 
tendencies to suggest that we need to fundamentally re-orient our relationship with 
nature, so that we may find a more sustainable way of living on the Earth, or the promise 
that we may overcome certain ‘natural’ limitations through the embrace of ‘clean’ tech 
and the digital economy, we construe the environmental crisis as a problem to be solved 
through the reconfiguration of human life. In doing this we may miss what is a more 
political problem, which has underwritten the modern era and led us to the present 
moment. The distinction between earth and world forces us to confront this question 
from the other side, starting from the premise that there is a measure of artificiality to 
this task which will necessarily involve political decisions about how we may want to live. 
As eco-political movements seek our re-enchantment with the earth, we may also need to 
be re-enchanted with the world, as a political space permeated by distance and openness 
to plurality and freedom, if we are to rechart the current trajectory.  This is not to say that 
we need to deny our earthly existence if we are to embrace our political capacities but to 
recognise that human life, “earthbound”11 as it is, is a complex weave of naturally given 
and artificial elements. Environmentalist movements sensitive to this point should be 
weary to consider the world in their endeavors to reconnect with the earth; meaning that 
they should embrace the contingency and incompleteness of the world, as opposed to the 
systematic closed network of interconnections that we may understand under the term 
‘globe’.12 The appeal of Arendt’s phenomenology of world is that it reveals the complexity 
11  For a further discussion of this term within Arendt’s thought see Belcher & Schmidt 2021: 105.
12  Such a concern echoes what Oliver Marchart identifies when he discusses the distinction between “globus” 
and “mundus” in the context of anti-globalization political movements. Marchart warns of “the fatal notion of
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of this artificial space, helping us to see what may be at stake if it is overlooked in 
contemporary discussions. Seeing the artificiality of the world as distinct from the 
materiality of the earth may prove to be useful for preventing a conflation of de-
individuation and dehumanisation (Last 2017: 83) in environmentalist debates as it 
emphasizes how “the same institutions that create rights, or better said allow individuals 
to become human subjects by reciprocally granting rights to each other, also destroy 
these rights and thus threaten the human” (Balibar 2007: 734). Understanding how the 
fabric of the world is woven together in such a way that it permits the dissent of the 
inhabitants to call into question the constitution of this space may help us to see how the 
world persists through the moments of deconstruction and re-construction anew.
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